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The Blessings of Troubles: 
Scholarly Innovation in Response to Latin America’s Challenges 
By Jorge I. Domínguez, Harvard University 
 Scholars have long responded to the challenges that lived reality poses before 
their eyes. The outpouring of social science research in response to the collapse of 
Germany’s democratic Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazis is perhaps the best 
known example of the past century but so too was the extensive scholarship regarding the 
Russian revolution and the onset of European decolonization in Africa, Asia, and the 
Caribbean. Latinamericanist political scientists, too, have addressed an array of 
challenges that the region experienced over the past half century and, in so doing, 
contributed to broader scholarly debates in comparative politics.  
In this chapter, I identify a number of scholarly insights that served well the study 
of Latin America and comparative politics more generally. The focus is on the work 
produced in response to experienced problems since the “take off” in the 1960s of the 
scholarly study of Latin American politics in the United States and Latin America, which 
owes much to Ford Foundation funding throughout the hemisphere especially in that 
decade. I take up four topics in approximate chronological order of their rise onto the 
scholarly agenda: the political economy of globalization, political regime transitions, 
presidentialist institutions, and voting behavior. The first two feature a much longer 
scholarly trajectory whereas the latter two developed with greater vigor since the 1990s. 
Each topic is intrinsically important. With regard to each, I argue that scholars of Latin 
America formulated a research agenda in response to the problems they perceived in the 
 2 
countries that they studied and, in so doing, contributed insights of value not just to those 
focused on Latin America but also more generally to scholars in comparative politics. 
In each of these four sets of studies, Latinamericanists showed the value of 
building on but also moving beyond the assumptions of scholarship that had been derived 
exclusively from research on Western Europe and North America. Latinamericanists 
provided the basis for wider and more insightful comparative analysis regarding the 
impact of international asymmetries and the varying strategies that countries may follow 
to cope with them; the role of agency — military and civilian — in political regime 
change; the variegated formulations of presidentialist institutions as they relate to 
economic development, not just simple dichotomies between presidentialism and 
parliamentarism; and the role of political campaigns — more salient in emerging than in 
consolidated democracies — in shaping the voting choices of citizens on election day. 
 
The political economy of globalization 
 One salient question of our time has been the opportunities and constraints that 
the international economy presents for countries the world over. Europeanists focused on 
them in the 1980s and, with greater intensity, in more recent times.1 Scholars sought to 
understand the structural bases for international economic engagement, the domestic 
consequences of adjustments to marked setbacks of the international economy, and the 
competitive strategies of firms and countries, which emphasizes domestic coordination to 
                                                
1 Among them, see Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to 
International Economic Crises (Cornell University Press, 1986); Ronald Rogowski, “Political Cleavages 
and Changing Exposure to Trade,” American Political Science Review 81 (December 1987): 1121-1136; 
Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Cornell University Press, 1985); Geoffrey Garrett, 
“Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?” International Organization, 
52 (1998): 787-824; Torben Iversen and Thomas R. Cusack, “The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: 
Deindustrialization or Globalization?” World Politics 52 (April 2000): 313-349. 
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face the world as small countries engage in international markets. Recent scholarship has 
examined the impact of international economic globalization on the welfare state and, 
generally, on the fiscal and budgetary policies of governments to compensate for costs 
imposed on domestic economies or to enhance the international competitiveness of firms.  
Before scholars in the North Atlantic world returned to focus on these questions 
in the late twentieth century, a previous body of scholarship on the industrialized 
economies, rooted in central and eastern Europe and Japan, had emphasized the relatively 
benign effects of international competition for the development of country strategies: the 
later developers could learn from the early developers, adopt and adapt technologies 
discovered elsewhere, and better mobilize international resources.2 By the 1960s, this had 
become the received wisdom. 
Latinamericanist scholars were among the first to re-examine the relationship 
between the international and the domestic economy and to challenge the hypothesis 
regarding benign effects. More than the Europeanists, Latinamericanists highlighted the 
problematic impact of the world economy on domestic markets. Much of the work in the 
late 1940s and 1950s in the region clustered around Raúl Prebisch and his leadership of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.  
In terms of development strategy, Albert Hirschman was an articulate early 
dissenter from the happy talk of scholarship regarding the already industrialized 
economies.3 Late-late developers, he argued, adopted technologies without contributing 
much to applied research or new technological development; they also were less likely to 
                                                
2 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1962); Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial 
Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
3 Albert O. Hirschman, “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 82:1 (1968): 1-32. 
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exhibit the entrepreneurial energies that Europeanist scholars had found in comparable 
firms in historical European contexts. In such situations of technological and 
entrepreneurial ineffectiveness, development was difficult.  
In the 1960s, these various strands of scholarship took a turn and evolved into 
what came to be known collectively as the “dependency” school or approach to the study 
of the region, albeit always encompassing a variety of different strains. Most dependency 
scholarship was rooted in an argument well summarized by Theotonio Dos Santos. 
Dependency, he wrote, is “a situation in which the economy of certain countries is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which the former 
is subjected.”4 Autonomous efforts to apply science to develop new products, 
dependency scholars claimed, would likely lead to buyouts by multinational enterprises, 
leaving little net additional domestic technological development while draining 
entrepreneurship.5 
Research on dependency in Latin America waned during the economic spurt of 
the 1990s but circumstances in the early twentieth-century again led some scholars to 
observe and name the political economy of globalization and its impact on Latin America 
as their predecessors had in the 1960s: dependency.6 
In the 2000s, Latinamericanist scholars responded to the legacy of prior research 
in the region and the more recent scholarship in North Atlantic countries on the impact of 
globalization on the welfare state. In most Latin American countries, the notion of the 
“welfare state” is still an aspiration, not a reality. In the wealthier Latin American 
                                                
4 Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” American Economic Review 60 (1970), 231. 
5 Gary Gereffi, “Drug Firms and Dependency in Mexico: The Case of the Steroid Hormone Industry,” 
International Organization 32 (1978): 237-286. 
6 For example, Erik Wibbels, “Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social 
Spending in the Developing World,” International Organization 60 (2006): 51-75. 
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countries, the “welfare state” exists principally for those in the economy’s formal sector. 
In this more constrained context than what prevails in the prosperous North Atlantic 
countries, scholars of Latin America found that trade integration was most adverse to 
pensions and that the greater severity of business cycle downswings made countercyclical 
spending much less feasible at those times. On the other hand, the free play of democratic 
politics served to protect pensions in the formal sector thanks to the role of labor unions 
and union-connected political parties.  
More generally, in the 1990s and the 2000s the relationship between unions and 
parties was a key factor in explaining the success or failure of market-oriented 
adjustments and reforms in new international contexts — the closer the alliance between 
a union and a political party, the more restrained the union turned out to be, whereas 
inter-partisan competition for the leadership of the unions increased union militancy and 
reduced the likelihood of market reforms. The interaction between international effects 
and partisan and union politics contributed to sustained domestic inequality (e.g., 
pensions for the better off only because the unions protected their members while global 
factors put downward pressures on pension provision), even as poverty rates began to 
decline in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico around the start of the twenty-first century. Better 
than their authoritarian predecessors, however, democratic governments protected 
spending on health and primary education to remedy social ills and empower citizens and 
firms to face changing world markets.7  
                                                
7 For example, see Robert Kaufman and Alex Segura-Ubiergo, “Globalization, Domestic Politics, and 
Social Spending in Latin America,” World Politics 53 (2001): 553-587; Wibbels, “Dependency Revisited;” 
George Avelino, David Brown, and Wendy Hunter, “The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and 
Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America,” American Journal of Political Science 49 (2005): 625-
641; and María Victoria Murillo, Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 6 
In Europe, the political economy of globalization by the end of the twentieth 
century had led to the growth of the role of the state by means of investing in education to 
make firms more competitive and also to compensate those adversely affected by 
globalization. In Latin America, the political economy of globalization encompassed 
trends that undermined the state, as just noted, but also trends that provided for forms of 
state action to manage dependency situations. Dependency scholars were not uniformly 
lugubrious; they also developed and called attention to successful dependency 
management strategies. 
One dependency-management strategy was to ride the international economy. 
Already in the early 1960s, Dudley Seers argued that Latin America’s small open 
economies in Central America rode the business cycles of the international economy, 
generally experiencing low inflation and infrequent currency devaluations. Subsequent 
research showed that Central American economies long remained tethered to the business 
cycles of the international economy, with cycles of both out-performance and under-
performance.8 
A second successful dependency-management strategy created national 
champions in the production and export of primary products, ordinarily through state 
action. Successful cases featured several elements. 1. Multinational enterprises had been 
under-investing in their companies. 2. Government technocrats had been learning both 
the technical and business aspects required to run the enterprise. 3. Political parties and 
elite opinion coalesced to lead to a unanimous or nearly unanimous vote in Congress to 
expropriate the foreign firm. 4. Market-conforming state enterprises were created, right 
                                                
8 Dudley Seers, “A Theory of Inflation and Growth in Under-Developed Economies Based on the 
Experience of Latin America,” Oxford Economic Papers 14 (June 1962): 173-195; Marc Lindenberg, 
“World Economic Cycles and Central American Political Instability,” World Politics 42 (1990): 397-421. 
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away or in a short time, that would remain profitable for many years. Multinational 
enterprises operating in Chile’s copper sector were expropriated, yes, under the socialist 
government of President Salvador Allende but with political support from the entire 
ideological spectrum in the Chilean Congress. Chile’s state-owned copper enterprise 
remained state-owned and profitable under the subsequent dictatorship of President 
Augusto Pinochet and since 1990 under democratic rule. Multinational enterprises 
operating in Venezuela’s petroleum sector were expropriated upon a unanimous vote of 
Congress.9 The state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela would remain a highly profitable 
market-conforming state enterprise until Hugo Chávez’s presidency. 
A third successful strategy developed the domestic market capacity to 
industrialize and to join the industrialized world on one’s own terms. Cardoso and Faletto, 
gurus of dependency scholarship, already foreshadowed in the 1970s that Brazil was en 
route to significant economic growth, which they labeled “associated dependent 
development” to signal its particular relationship to world markets. The relationship 
between a strong Brazilian state, capable of intervening effectively in domestic markets, 
along with multinational enterprises and national private firms, set Brazil on a path to 
growth.10 In the decades that followed, medium and small countries — Colombia and 
Costa Rica — would also wed the state and private firms to enable their economies to 
compete more effectively in international markets.11 
                                                
9 Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Franklin Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1975). 
10 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America, trans. 
Marjory Mattingly Urquidi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), Postscript; Peter Evans, 
“Multinationals, State-Owned Corporations, and the Transformation of Imperialism: A Brazilian Case 
Study,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 26 (1977): 43-64. 
11 Marcus Kurtz and Sarah Brooks, “Embedding Neoliberal Reform in Latin America,” World Politics 60 
(2008): 231-280. 
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The least successful yet frequently-discussed strategy for dependency 
management in Latin America was regional trade integration or the creation of a common 
market. Despite moments of apparent success, most recently in the 1990s, attempts at 
intensifying economic integration in Latin America have had modest results. The 
southern common market (MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL), the Central American Common 
Market, or the Andean Community rarely account for more than one-fifth of the 
international trade of member states. The only significant intensification of economic ties 
occurred through embracing dependency — the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) advanced economic integration in North America and accounts for not less 
than two-fifths of the international trade of its member states. 
The dependency literature became best known for what Latin American 
economies could not do — they could not grow, industrialize, integrate, or generate mass 
prosperity. My reading takes note of some key debilities of Latin America’s growth path 
but it emphasizes the three main strategies that the region undertook, which served it well 
to address the practical problems that arose during the past half-century: ride international 
economy commodity booms (of which the most recent unfolded during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century), develop national champions (by expropriation if necessary) but 
ensure that they operate by market-conforming principles, and develop the domestic 
economy with a mix of state action and private markets to compete effectively. Some of 
Latin America’s most successful companies in the new century — CVRD and Embraer, 
for example — began as state enterprises and the state remains an investor to some extent. 
Market-conforming state enterprises are neither an oxymoron nor a legacy of 
Latin America’s Jurassic past (when many of its state enterprises did not at all operate on 
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market principles) but, rather, a normal component of the political economy of market-
oriented democracies. In 2003, for example, the asset value of state-owned enterprises as 
a percentage of gross domestic product ranged between 15 percent and 35 percent in 
Sweden, Italy, France, South Korea, Turkey, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, and the 
Netherlands.12 Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica pursued different variants of this 
strategy but, in each, state and private firms, domestic and international, were crucial. 
These approaches to dependency management served Latin America well as the twentieth 
century opened. 
With regard to state enterprises in particular, Latinamericanist scholarship 
contributed more broadly to the study of comparative politics. Consider one example. In 
the last third of the twentieth century, the premier worldwide scholar on the spread of 
multinational enterprises was Raymond Vernon, whose professional affiliations spanned 
the worlds of business school and political science department. Vernon’s early work 
focused on Mexico and more generally on Latin America. He drew from that scholarly 
experience to write about state enterprises and multinational enterprises in global 
contexts, anchored in and nurtured by what he learned in Latin America, and he engaged 
his own students in similar work. At the heart of his research was an endeavor to 
understand the intertwining between the state and business, the over-time changing 
asymmetries between multinational private firms and the states, and the rise of state 
enterprises as one response to the changing world economy.13 
                                                
12 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Corporate Government of State-Owned 
Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005). 
13 See, for example, Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma of Mexico’s Development: The Roles of the Private 
and the Public Sectors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at 
Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Raymond Vernon and 
Yair Aharoni, eds., State-owned Enterprise in the Western Economies (London: Croom Helm, 1981); and 
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The Latinamericanist research on the asymmetrical impact of the world economy 
on domestic politics enriched the wider field of comparative politics, therefore, by 
demonstrating a wider variation in outcomes than the research on the North Atlantic 
countries had shown — international asymmetry magnified the impact of exogenous 
shocks for countries with fewer resources to mitigate them and demanded of those 
countries innovative strategies to cope with a mix of global opportunity and adversity..  
 
Political regime transitions 
 Alone among the regions of the world, Latin America has been a participant in the 
three waves of democratization evident since the nineteenth century and in both 
counterwaves of authoritarian rule.14 Latin America’s democratization began in Uruguay 
and Argentina early in the twentieth century. Regime breakdowns repopulated the region 
with authoritarian regimes in the 1930s. The second wave of democratic regimes 
appeared or reappeared in the aftermath of World War II, to break down in the 1960s and 
1970s as part of the second authoritarian counterwave; by the second half of the 1970s, 
democratic regimes in the region had become an endangered species. Latin America’s 
third wave of democratization began in the Dominican Republic in 1978 and Ecuador in 
1979, thence spreading throughout the region. Early in the twenty-first century, there is 
an authoritarian counter-ripple: Autocratic tendencies marked President Hugo Chávez’s 
government in Venezuela; in 2008, President Daniel Ortega’s government engineered 
widespread fraud in municipal elections in Nicaragua and, in 2009, a military coup 
                                                                                                                                            
Raymond Vernon and Ravi Ramamurti, eds., Privatization and Control of State-owned Enterprises 
(Washington: World Bank, 1991). 
14 Samuel Huntington coined the “waves” metaphor. See his The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
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overthrew the constitutionally elected President of Honduras. In contrast, colonial Africa 
and Asia missed the first wave of democratization and Western Europe missed the second 
wave back to authoritarian rule. Latin America’s public miseries and democratic triumphs 
are well reflected in a vast scholarly literature, which focused especially on the second 
wave of authoritarian rule and the third wave of democratization. Here, I attempt to 
account for the findings. 
 Structural economic conditions, such as the problems encountered with import 
substitution industrialization, turned out to matter less as explanations for the rise of the 
authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s than some scholars thought at first.15 
Nevertheless, inflation, recession, various dimensions of the business cycle, ideas about 
the organizations of the economy, and international market shocks played important roles 
in regime change, sometimes as proximate causes, more often as background causes. For 
example, Latin America’s prolonged and deep economic downturn of the 1980s 
facilitated exiting from authoritarian regimes that did not govern the economy well.16 But 
such conditions were mainly background — political actors had to act.  
A key finding regarding the relationship between economics and political regimes 
is that dictatorship is most common in poor countries while democracies in poor 
countries are vulnerable to coups. 17Above some level of economic development, a 
                                                
15 Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, 1973); David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in 
Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
16Among others, see Michael Wallerstein, “The Collapse of Democracy in Brazil: Its Economic 
Determinants,” Latin American Research Review 15 (1980): 3-34; Héctor Schamis, “Reconceptualizing 
Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism,” 
Comparative Politics 23 (1991): 201-216; Karen Remmer, “Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin 
American Experience,” World Politics 42 (1990): 315-335 and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The 
Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
17 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49 
(1997): 155-183. 
 12 
democratic breakdown is extremely rare. Latin America, alas, has had many democratic 
attempts in poor countries and, as a result, also many breakdowns of such attempts. Latin 
America hosts also the only country worldwide whose democratic regime broke down 
even though it was above the level of development at which no other democratic regime 
anywhere broke down in the years past 1950: Argentina. In general, therefore, wealth 
buys many things, among them economic and political liberty but much of Latin America 
has lacked the “political insurance” of sufficient wealth to secure its democratic regimes. 
 International political factors — the Cold War — turned out to matter more as 
explanations for the rise and decline of authoritarian regimes than many scholars thought 
at first. The scholarship on bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, typically quite aware of 
international political economy issues, seemed often unaware of the Cold War. A key 
explanation for the sustained authoritarianism in Central American countries from the 
1950s through the 1980s was the policy of the U.S. government in the context of the Cold 
War.18 Democratization in Central America in the 1990s had, as a necessary task, the 
dispelling of the demons that had seized hold of the U.S. government during the 
preceding decades. Similarly, U.S. Cold War policy is part of the explanation for military 
coups in Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973, just as the change in U.S. policy in the late 
1980s also assisted with the end of authoritarian regimes in Paraguay and Chile.19 
 One important difference between the two types of political regime change turned 
out to be simple: the role of military coups. Such coups most often brought about the 
breakdown of constitutional democratic regimes. While coups sometimes depose 
                                                
18 For example, see Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime 
Change in the Cold War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008); Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial 
Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).  
19 Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 
 13 
dictators and open the path for democratic elections (Colombia in 1957, Venezuela in 
1958, Paraguay in 1989), coups are generally much less likely instruments for 
democratization. The scholarship on political regime change followed by military rule 
emphasized, first, the shift in the 1960s toward institutional military coups — in contrast 
to solo dictatorships — and also the greater emphasis in military doctrine on an ideology 
of “national security” that looked for enemies — most often labeled communists, real or 
imaginary — among fellow citizens.20 In the 1960s and 1970s, the military also often 
expanded their roles to run state enterprises and manage the nation’s politics.  
As a result, the process of democratization often required ousting the military 
both from control of the state and also from their roles generally in law enforcement, the 
leadership of state enterprises, and the making of key budget decisions. The military 
often sought immunity from prosecution for acts they committed while running the 
government, including killings and torture of prisoners, and claimed prerogatives to set or 
to shape significantly policies on budgets, weapons acquisitions, personnel promotion, 
and other topics. Thus the process of demilitarization under constitutional democracies 
was often prolonged. The election of a civilian president was often just one step along a 
longer path toward democratization, which required substantial and sustained 
contestation. In the end, success was a tribute to inter-party competition in election after 
election.21 The actual realization of liberalization and democratization often took a great 
deal of time even after civilians returned to the presidency because, beyond lingering 
                                                
20 Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, Armies and Politics in Latin America (Revised edition. New 
York: Holmes and Meier, 1986). 
21 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998); Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Wendy Hunter, “Continuity or Change? Civil-
Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru,” Political Science Quarterly 112 (1997): 453-
475. 
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military claims of immunity and prerogatives, clientelist politics and traditional-politics 
authoritarian enclaves endured as well.22 
Similarly, one important difference between types of military-led political 
regimes was real historical time. The interaction of three factors contributed to making 
military rule harsher in the 1970s than in the 1960s. First, in the 1970s the world 
economy was marked by slower growth and higher inflation, adversely affecting Latin 
America’s economies. Second, the rising number of military regimes and the wide 
sharing of the Cold War “national security” ideology intensified and “normalized” the 
search for domestic enemies. Third, the military coups of the 1970s, and the rulers they 
buttressed, responded to, and generated, a rising spiral of political violence. Larger 
numbers of political killings, imprisonment, and torture were the responses of the rulers, 
to which the courts and other institutions responded poorly and unevenly.23 More 
widespread urban insurgency, including terrorist actions in several South American 
countries and revolution in three Central American countries, were the responses from 
part of the opposition. 
 Much more numerous than studies regarding the role of the military in regime 
changes were those studies that in the 1980s emphasized the role of political elites — 
hardliners and softliners — in contestation, negotiation, and settlement during 
democratizing political regime transitions. These processes, O’Donnell and Schmitter 
argued, were marked by “the high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where 
unexpected events (fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, 
                                                
22 Frances Hagopian, Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
23 Anthony Pereira, Political (In)Justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and 
Argentina (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005). 
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confusion about motives and interests, plasticity, and even indefinition of political 
identities, as well as the talents of specific individuals (virtù) are frequently decisive in 
determining the outcomes.”24 A coup could take place in an instant. Liberalization and 
democratization would span months, and often years. A coup changed the political 
regime overnight. Democratization often involved partial, gradual changes, including 
concessions to the military or conservative elites that would only be reversed years later. 
An important corrective to this elite-agency approach, which underplayed the role of civil 
society, was research that showed that labor unions often played crucial roles in opening 
the gates that would subsequently allow civilian elites to negotiate the transition. The 
labor movement often placed on the public agenda issues of democratic rights and 
procedures that negotiating elites dared not forget.25 Such union action linked the labor 
movement’s voluntary collective action with its structural roots. 
 The political violence mentioned above was a backdrop to negotiations over 
democratization in the 1980s. Democratic elites wanted to avoid a hardliner coup either 
before or following a democratic transition and characteristically opposed a resort to 
violence. Authoritarian regime softliners held the specter of wider political violence from 
the opposition in order to induce the hardliners to agree to concessions. 
 The Latinamericanist scholarship on political regime transitions had a widespread 
impact. The O’Donnell-Schmitter short book, just cited, would be discussed at Harvard 
Business School executive education programs held in South Africa to help elites prepare 
for their democratic transition of the early 1990s. One of their key collaborators in the 
                                                
24 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 5. 
25 Ruth Collier and James Mahoney, “Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent 
Democratization in South America and Southern Europe,” Comparative Politics 29 (1997): 285-303. 
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O’Donnell-Schmitter project, Adam Przeworski, went from his work on South America 
to research on Eastern Europe. His work on both regions employed game-theoretic tools, 
emphasizing contingency and uncertainty to examine the role of political agency. 
Schooled in the very Southamericanist scholarship on regime transitions he helped to 
develop, Przeworski has focused his analysis on political action and criticized purely 
structuralist arguments that implied that modernization or economic growth led linearly 
to political democratization.26 Major producers of the scholarly of regime transitions in 
Latin America, such as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, took their tools to analyze political 
transitions in former communist Europe, with a focus on institutional choices — how to 
constitutionalize the armed forces, how to design executive and legislative institutions 
preferably (see next section) along parliamentary lines, etc.27  
 Political regime transitions, of course, have also strong normative dimensions — 
how to open up public spaces for citizens to express their views and to associate freely. 
The normative reasons are also real and pressing — how to avoid killings and torture. 
The passions that generate political transitions require an optimism whose roots are often 
difficult to fathom in societies where so many have suffered so grievously for so long. 
Thus it is worth quoting from a country and a time when optimism seemed a lost cause, 
just to remember that it is possible to imagine and wish better politics for the human 
condition. In The Optimist’s Salutation, the Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío (1867-1916) 
wrote as follows: “And thus let Hope be the ever-lasting vision among us.”28 
                                                
26 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
27 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: South Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
28 Rubén Darío, “Salutación del optimista,” in Poesía española contemporánea, ed. Gerardo Diego (Madrid: 
Taurus, 1962), 36-38. 
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Presidentialist institutions 
 Latin America is the world’s only region to feature presidentialist rather than 
parliamentary systems in democratic regimes. (Europe and the Caribbean host 
parliamentary democratic regimes; the Middle East features authoritarian regimes; East 
and Southeast Asia mix presidentialist democratic and authoritarian regimes.) In an essay 
originally written in 1984, Juan Linz argued that presidentialist systems are inimical to 
stable democracy.29 Empirically, most of the world’s stable democracies have 
parliamentary regimes. In presidentialist systems, president and legislature are elected 
separately, which reduces the likelihood that the executive would command a legislative 
majority. Presidents are elected for fixed terms; the legislature may remove them only 
through impeachment, which often requires a super-majority. Both the president and the 
legislators claim legitimacy from direct popular election; they can deadlock the 
government and generate a constitutional crisis. Presidentialism intends to create a strong 
executive but often sets up the likelihood of confrontation, failure, and, in the extreme 
case, a coup to resolve the gridlock. In the Latin American cases, moreover, the mix of 
presidentialism and a multiparty system makes it more difficult to fashion stable 
governing majorities for democratic rule, creating propitious conditions for a coup.30 
 A giant in the study of comparative politics, Linz was taken seriously by 
constitutional Solons. Brazilians actually voted in a plebiscite on whether to adopt 
parliamentarism; they rejected it. This new Linz-tinted perception of an old problem 
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spawned a new scholarship on the presidency, which for the most part generated a more 
benign reading of the relationship between presidentialism and democracy.31 
 A critique of anti-presidentialism starts from the claim that there is a spurious 
correlation. Parliamentary regimes developed in countries that have become wealthy; 
presidentialist regimes exist more often in poor countries. As already noted, democracy in 
poor countries is disproportionately vulnerable to breakdown and this — not 
presidentialism — may explain the breakdown of democratic regimes in much of Latin 
America. Moreover, there are no parliamentary regimes in Latin America; there are no 
pure presidentialist regimes in Western Europe. It is thus impossible to say whether, 
controlling for international, regional, and transocietal milieu, presidentialism explains 
coups in Latin America and parliamentarism explains democratic stability in Western 
Europe. Breakdowns in one and stability in the other may be associated with factors other 
than institutional regime in the respective regions. 
 Moreover, not all presidentialist designs are alike. The associated institutional 
designs within which a presidency exists matter a great deal. The governability problem 
is lessened if presidents and legislatures are chosen in concurrent elections, which 
increase the likelihood that the president would gain stronger legislative support.32 More 
generally, concurrent elections along with electing the president by a plurality of votes 
cast (not through second-round majority run-off elections), and closed party list 
proportional representation rules for legislative elections, increase the likelihood of 
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executive-legislative coordination.33 Compare Brazil to Mexico, Latin America’s two 
largest countries, both with concurrent elections upon the election of the president. 
Mexico has closed party lists and plurality presidential election; Brazil has open lists and 
relies upon a second-round presidential election. Nearly 70 percent of Brazilian voters 
were ticket-splitters in the 2002 presidential election whereas only about 9 percent of 
Mexican voters split their ticket in the 2000 presidential election. Gubernatorial coattails 
are stronger than presidential coattails in Brazil.34 Institutional choices matter. 
Coordination between president and legislature may also occur past the election. 
Where presidents must rely on their partisan powers to govern, executive-legislative 
coordination may follow the path of negotiation; where presidents rely disproportionately 
on their formal constitutional powers, presidents may use executive-decree powers and 
veto legislative bills. Presidents who confront or ignore the legislature undermine 
democratic constitutionalism and may reduce their own prospects to finish their term.35 
Here is a key to Brazil’s circumstances notwithstanding the complications created by its 
electoral institutions: Brazilian presidents have very high constitutional powers but 
Presidents Cardoso and Lula preferred to use their partisan powers to work through 
Congress to enact their policies; they promoted changes in the institutional rules of 
Congress to foster party discipline and coordination, and they successfully employed 
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these among other means to enact laws.36 The partisan powers of presidents must be 
continuously constructed and renewed. Presidents are most likely to succeed in the 
legislature if they work with their fellow party members; presidents are likely to fail if 
they detach from or neglect their partisan allies.37 
 Finally, since the late 1970s the coerced departures of freely- and directly-elected 
Latin American civilian presidents resulted in every case in new civilian presidents. In 
that period, no democratically elected Latin American president, ousted from office, was 
replaced by a military president. Presidential defenestration has in every case provoked a 
sort of political bargaining that resembled parliamentarism. This is a form of instability, 
perhaps more worrisome than Belgium with Acting Prime Ministers for months at a time, 
but it is no longer the descent into military dictatorship.38 Moreover, not all interruptions 
of a presidency are alike — coups bring down democratic regimes but presidential 
impeachments are inherently proper procedures in democratic presidentialist regimes. 
The successful impeachment of the president in Brazil in 1992 or in Paraguay in 1999 
sustained rather than derailed a democratic regime. Impeachments are one mechanism 
whereby presidentialist systems resemble elements of parliamentary systems.39 
 In this subfield, the study of presidentialist systems in Latin America specifically, 
and comparative politics more generally, greatly overlap. As noted, Latin America is the 
world’s only region to feature presidentialist rather than parliamentary systems in 
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democratic regimes; outside of Latin America, add just a handful of cases. As a result, the 
generalizations with regard to presidentialist institutions apply well to Latin American 
cases and were developed first and foremost by Latinamericanist scholars. There would 
be no comparative politics of executive and legislative institutions in presidentialist 
systems if it were not for the comparative politics research program that Matthew Shugart 
and John Carey launched through their work on institutional design in Latin America.40 
Design matters in presidentialist systems. It accounts for a wide range of variation 
that the Latin American cases illustrate well, to the benefit of comparative politics 
scholarship worldwide and the enlightenment of constituent assemblies. 
 
Voting behavior 
 The third wave of democratization in Latin America opened a new window of 
opportunity for practice and research: elections and voting behavior. An ideologically 
“Right” authoritarian regime in Argentina and an ideologically “Left” authoritarian 
regime in Peru in the 1970s did away with elections. “Softer” authoritarian regimes, such 
as those in Brazil and Mexico, held elections either under rigged conditions or, especially 
in Mexico, infected by fraudulent practices. Today’s senior Latin Americanists did not 
spend much time on elections and voting behavior when they were graduate students. 
Both the presence of elections and the absence of an older scholarship make this topic 
rife with opportunity for younger scholars. 
 Latin Americans vote especially when it is a novelty. “Founding” elections —as 
political regime transition scholars would expect — exhibit turnout rates considerably 
higher than in other elections, controlling statistically for other variables thought to be 
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related to turnout. Similarly, the sustained adherence to the protection of political rights 
and civil liberties increase the likelihood of election turnout. Concurrent elections —
following the implications from the previous section — generate higher levels of turnout 
in both presidential and legislative elections: there is more at stake, there is more media 
coverage, and more comprehensive partisan and social movement mobilization. 
Mandatory voting also increases turnout; it is 20 percent higher than turnout in countries 
with voluntary voting, controlling for other independent variables.41 In each such instance, 
the decisions of politicians may have a positive or negative effect on electoral turnout. 
 Latin American voters have several objectives in mind on election day. In broad 
terms, sociotropic retrospective national economic voting is an important explanation for 
voting behavior. This means that Latin American voters support the incumbent 
president’s party when aggregate economic outcomes have been good during this 
presidency, and punish the incumbent’s party when those national economic outcomes 
have been poor. Nevertheless, the choice of voters is constrained by institutional setting. 
Restrictive electoral rules sometimes leave voters no choice but to punish an incumbent 
party by voting for a nonincumbent party that had, during a previous time in office, also 
been responsible for poor economic governance. Only if the electoral rules permit the rise 
of third parties can voters back politicians who had never governed, thus punishing 
everyone who had ever governed badly, current as well as past incumbent parties.42 
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 In some countries, voters had to decide on the incumbent president running for 
reelection, who prior to his first election may have promised one set of policies but 
delivered quite another. Around 1990, about half of the successful presidential candidates 
across Latin America implemented as president policies at odds with the promises they 
had made during their election campaign. These “switchers” adversely burden democratic 
accountability. Carlos Menem in Argentina, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Carlos Andrés 
Pérez in Venezuela, elected president within just over a year of each other, are examples 
of “switchers” — they ran for office as critics of market-oriented policies and went on to 
implement precisely those policies. In general, at reelection time, voters held their noses, 
voting to reelect those whose policies had generated economic growth (Menem, Fujimori) 
and punished Pérez, whose policies had not.43 
 In some instances, more than one issue is salient. Peru started the 1990s suffering 
from both a severe economic crisis and high levels of political violence. With some 
hyperbole, Fujimori claimed credit for ending the political violence and reviving the 
economy. Voters considered his counterinsurgency success a solved problem, which thus 
had lower impact on the vote; at the time of his reelection, voters rewarded him more for 
the economic outcomes.44 This capacity of the voters to discern on questions of 
importance connects with the previous discussion about ticket-splitting in elections. 
Voters seek different objectives in their voting for president and legislature, and thus may 
vote for different parties at different levels of government. 
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 Not all voting is sociotropic. The longest-lasting form of voting responds to 
individual utility. Politicians and parties have employed clientelistic methods, including 
individual vote buying, patronage appointments, pork barrel for targeted communities, 
and the like. By the current century, however, individual vote buying had become less 
common even in countries, such as Mexico, where it was once widespread.45 Research on 
vote buying in Argentina also demonstrates that its aggregate significance is important 
but modest; it may be focused on increasing turnout from those in communities favorable 
to a specific party. Moreover, not all parties in the same country are equally effective at 
using clientelist methods. In Argentina, for example, Peronists trump Radicals and other 
parties in the efficacy of use of clientelist practices to obtain voting support.46 
 Voting behavior research raises the question of the role of parties in shaping the 
voting choice. As the twentieth century ended, many long-lived parties had not fared well. 
In Venezuela, which had had one of Latin America’s most institutionalized party systems 
since its democratic transition in 1958, the two parties that had alternated in governing 
the country were badly battered. Acción Democrática lost the bulk of its voting support 
while COPEI (Christian Democrats) disintegrated. In the pivotal 1998 election that 
brought Hugo Chávez to the presidency, many voters abandoned their previous partisan 
affiliations, motivated by negative views of parties and dissatisfaction with their past 
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performance. Venezuelans seemed frustrated with the shortcomings of the party system 
as a whole and its inability to provide citizens with voice and influence.47 
 Some long-fragmented party systems remained so, in part as a result of the 
fraction of the population that is indigenous. The failure of most parties until the 1990s to 
represent indigenous peoples adequately led many indigenous voters to support a variety 
of small populist or leftist parties, which contributed to high and enduring levels of party 
system fragmentation as well as the relatively low impact of parties on the voting choice. 
As significant indigenous parties emerged, especially in Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous 
voters rallied to support them, albeit to varying extent across time and region.48 
 Where parties had not flourished until the 1980s, partisanship in the current 
century has proven strong: Brazil and Mexico. In Brazil’s presidential election in 2002, 
the aggregate level of partisanship exceeded levels prevailing in the most recent elections 
held in Germany, the Netherlands, Korea, and Chile. To be sure, partisanship in Brazil 
was highly skewed to the benefit of the Workers Party (PT). This is the result of a 
quarter-century trajectory of party-building efforts as well as the increased frequency of 
the PT’s electoral success. The PT’s partisan organization and the involvement of its 
supporters in politicized social networks account for its success.49 
 Partisanship in Mexico was difficult to discern before the highly contested 
presidential election held in 1988. The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was 
the party of the state, with uncertain “sincere” allegiance from those whom it counted as 
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its voters. A strong party of the left emerged only during and following that election, the 
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The long-suffering opposition party, the 
National Action Party (PAN), was small and, for many years, as concerned about its 
ideological and partisan purity and integrity as it was about winning elections. 
 Mexico in the twenty-first century has three strong parties; each commands 
significant support from a fraction of citizens. The now well-studied Mexican case 
illustrates some key themes in voting behavior.50 By the fall 2005, before the three major 
parties had chosen their candidates for the July 2006 election, approximately half of all 
Mexicans had decided for which party to vote for the presidency. Since the mid-1990s, 
about two-thirds of Mexicans consider themselves committed to one of the top three 
parties. The principal effect of Mexican campaigns has been to steer voters to support the 
presidential candidate of the party that has been their ongoing underlying preference.  
In every presidential election since 1988, three variables explain much about the 
distribution of voter preferences: partisanship, assessment of the incumbent president’s 
performance (Mexico prohibits incumbent reelection), and the assessment of the 
country’s economic circumstances. Each has been consistently significant in statistical 
and other analyses of public opinion and electoral behavior. There were relatively few 
partisan defectors in each election and, as noted, only limited split-ticket voting. 
Beginning in 2000 and continuing in 2006, candidate assessments played also a 
significant role. These were also Mexico’s first campaigns that resembled those in other 
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parts of the world. Television debates may have little impact in countries long used to 
them but in Mexico they are one factor in shaping the election choice. Negative 
advertising took off as a campaign tactic in the 2000 election and it resurfaced vigorously 
in the 2006 election. In both elections, negative advertising helped the eventual winner of 
each election — Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón. Their party, the PAN, had transitioned 
from being the party of nice boys and girls to having a nasty edge, hungry for victory.  
In many of these respects, Mexican voters turned out to be similar to those in 
well-established North Atlantic democracies where economic and partisan voting have 
long mattered. The novelty is that partisanship, so recent in Mexico, has so quickly sunk 
in roots. In Mexico, as in other recently democratized Latin American countries, research 
on public opinion and voting behavior has dispelled some stereotypes. Voters in Latin 
American countries do connect their preferences and interests to their voting behavior. 
They are capable of sustained loyalty to a specific party. They hold their elected 
representatives accountable and know how to vote out bad rulers. They discern their 
electoral choices and behave accordingly. 
Perhaps the most interesting contribution of the scholarship on voting behavior in 
democratic Latin America to the wider scholarship in on voting behavior in comparative 
politics is to demonstrate a wider range of variation than is found in the North Atlantic 
countries. In Mexico as in Brazil, in El Salvador as in Costa Rica, partisan commitments 
matter, but from election to election campaigns matter more and thus a larger fraction of 
voters may change its behavior than has historically been the case in the North Atlantic 
democracies. Latin American voters, moreover, have adapted to democratic politics far 
more quickly than some of the agency-based elite-bargaining scholarship on political 
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regime transition had expected — voters are not a tumultuous rabble threatening the 
consolidation of democracy. Voters in Latin American countries reward good governance 
and abandon long-supported parties that have performed badly, as good democrats should.  
Constrained by international circumstances, long hemmed in by authoritarian 
regimes, and with their choice shaped by presidentialist contexts, voters in Latin 
American countries, to paraphrase Karl Marx,51 may not be able to make their history just 
as they please but, within circumstances they have not chosen, they try as much as 
possible to make their own history. They are the greatest source of hope for effective 
democratic governance in Latin America.  
 
Conclusion 
 In 1959, with prodding and funding from the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie 
Corporation, and the Council on Higher Education of the American Republics, the 
American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council 
established the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies, which still exists. In 
February 1963, the Joint Committee convened its fourth conference, which was also the 
first that most foreshadowed the aims and design of this book in its broad assessment of 
social science research on Latin America. At this event, and for the widely-read book that 
followed, Kalman Silvert, at the time perhaps the most distinguished U.S. 
Latinamericanist political scientist, wrote as follows: “Latin America has always been a 
hearty consumer of European ideas and practices, and the university has long played a 
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vital part in the process of importation, adaptation, and propagation.”52 Silvert was 
correct, and therefore his accuracy serves as a benchmark for change. 
 Latin America’s place in the world is unlike Europe’s or North America’s and its 
engagement with the international economy has been markedly more subordinate and 
asymmetric than that of the North Atlantic countries. Latinamericanist scholars had to 
construct arguments and evidence to assess Latin America’s distinct interaction with 
international markets, specifically the greater burdens from marked asymmetries. The 
devastating European political experiences with war and genocide during the first half of 
the twentieth century were mercifully not replicated in Latin America, but this difference 
demanded of Latinamericanist scholars that they fashion their own frameworks to 
understand why democratic regimes in this region broke down repeatedly and why 
authoritarian regimes sprouted again and again. Latin America did not inherit the practice 
of parliamentarism; Latinamericanists had to figure out why their presidentialist systems 
varied as much and in what ways they resembled or differed from parliamentary systems. 
Only with regard to this essay’s fourth topic — voting behavior — may Silvert’s 
characterization still apply. Scholars of voting behavior in Latin American countries have 
for the most part adopted and adapted the theories and techniques first developed in the 
North Atlantic democracies to describe and explain how citizens in Latin American 
countries choose their rulers. Yet, even with regard to voting behavior, the scholarship 
regarding Latin America shows a more diverse range of voter behavior and a more 
decisive link between the choice on election day and the consolidation of democracy. 
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 The scholarship developed by Latinamericanists regarding the four topics in this 
essay has shaped how other scholars have thought about the politics of countries outside 
the North Atlantic world, starting with the relationship between poor countries in other 
longitudes and the world economy. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) was founded by Venezuela; scholars first studied in Venezuela how a weak state 
bargained successfully with multinational firms.53 A century ago, Brazil’s State of São 
Paulo undertook the first successful world market intervention to prop up commodity 
prices, coffee in this case; scholars who worked on this case have had a broad impact on 
scholarship worldwide.54 Latinamericanist scholarship also informed research on patterns 
of political regime change or endurance in former communist Europe and in East Asia 
and Africa. Latinamericanist scholarship helped to clarify analytical issues that surround 
the design and effects of presidentialist institutions worldwide and incorporated reams of 
new analyses and data regarding voting behavior into the canon of political science. Kal 
Silvert would have been proud that his historical analysis was not a forecast, and that 
change came to prevail in political science scholarship about Latin America. 
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